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THE EFFECT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS ON RANK-AND-FILE
COMPENSATION
JOSEPH BANKMAN*
Under current law, employees are not taxed on the value of employer
contributions to qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock-bonus plans
("retirement plans") or on the value of certain benefits, such as reimburse-
ment for medical expenses, provided through so-called welfare benefit
plans.' Employers, on the other hand, are allowed to deduct the full cost
of the contributions or benefits.' This favorable tax treatment is condi-
tioned, however, upon compliance with certain "anti-discrimination" rules.
In general, under those rules, benefits provided to highly compensated
employees must also be provided to non-highly compensated ("rank-and-
file") employees.
For most individuals, the desirability of the anti-discrimination rules will
depend in part on the effect such rules have on the cash compensation,
benefits, and perceived value of benefits provided to rank-and-file
employees. Consider, for example, two polar assumptions. Under the first
assumption, some portion of the cost of benefits provided to rank-and-file
employees is paid out of the surplus generated to highly compensated
employees and employers by the favorable tax rules. The compensation
package provided under the rules is perceived by rank-and-file employees
as more valuable than the all-cash compensation they would otherwise
receive. Under the second assumption, the cash compensation provided to
rank-and-file employees is reduced by the cost of the benefits. Rank-and-
file employees prefer cash to benefits and so regard their new compensation
package as less valuable than the all cash compensation they would
otherwise receive. Quite clearly, in this latter case, the anti-discrimination
provisions will be justified, if at all, only on paternalistic grounds or
* Professor of Law and Helen M. Crocker Faculty Scholar, Stanford University. The author
wishes to thank Ian Ayres, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Jeff Stmad and, especially, research assistants Ted
Fikre and Eric Talley, for their contributions to the paper. This author is greatly indebted to a former
student, Robert Rothenberg, whose superb seminar paper suggested that the effects of the anti-
discrimination provisions deserved a closer look.
1. I.R.C. §§ 105(h), 402, 403 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. I.RC. § 162, 404 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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because of the "free rider" problems posed by employees without pension
or medical benefits.
Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the anti-discrimination provisions
on compensation levels has been discussed in the legal literature only in a
few articles (including one by this author) and then only in summary
fashion.3 The subject has not been discussed at all in the economics
literature. The purpose of this Article is to provide a more considered,
though still quite basic, exposition of the effect the anti-discrimination
provisions are likely to have on rank-and-file compensation.
In general, the analysis herein supports prior analysis: the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions are likely to reduce the perceived welfare of rank-and-file
employees. However, the analysis below identifies a set of assump-
tions-relating to the relative value of tax-favored benefits, the ability of
employers to change the ratio of rank-and-file and highly compensated
workers, and the relationship between payroll costs and output-under
which the anti-discrimination provisions unambiguously improve the
welfare of rank-and-file employees.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides an overview of the
anti-discrimination provisions that govern pension and welfare benefit
plans. Part II examines the effect of such provisions in industries that
require a fixed ratio of highly compensated to rank-and-file workers. Part
III examines the effect of the anti-discrimination rules in industries in
which the ratio of highly compensated employees to rank-and-file
employees may change, either because one group of employees may be
substituted for another, or because automation may differentially affect one
group of employees. Part IV discusses the general equilibrium and other
considerations that may affect the economic analysis, including paternalistic
or free rider considerations that may justify the anti-discrimination
provisions even in those situations in which the provisions reduce the
perceived value of compensation received by rank-and-file workers. Part
V briefly notes other effects of the anti-discrimination provisions. The anti-
discrimination provisions may influence a firm's decision to expand
internally or to acquire additional labor by contracting with another firm.
The anti-discrimination provisions may also exacerbate the effects of
technological change on employment of rank-and-file workers.
3. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CMI. L. REV. 790 (1988); Bruce Wolk, Discrimination
Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. Ray. 419
(1984).
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I. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
The anti-discrimination provisions under current law, while limited in
number, are quite complex. In the pension area alone, a thorough
explanation of those provisions might run hundreds of pages. Fortunately,
for the purposes of this Article, such lengthy exposition is unnecessary. It
will be sufficient, instead, to provide a summary description of the two or
three most significant anti-discrimination provisions.
The single most important anti-discrimination provisions, in terms of
aggregate dollar of benefit covered, are those which apply to retirement
plans. In general, these provisions require that the ratio of retirement
benefits to total compensation must be as great for rank-and-file employees
as for highly compensated employees.4 Thus, a plan which offers a highly
compensated employee pension benefits equal to ten percent of salary must
also offer a rank-and-file employee pension benefits equal to ten percent of
salary. For the purposes of the pension provisions, a highly compensated
employee is defined as: (1) an employee with a five percent or greater
ownership interest in the enterprise; (2) employees who receive annual
compensation in excess of $96,386; (3) officers who receive annual
compensation in excess of $64,245; (4) and employees who receive annual
compensation in excess of $64,245 and whose compensation places them
in the upper twenty percent of the organization's employees.' These
figures are adjusted annually for inflation.6
The application of the anti-discrimination provisions to employee welfare
benefit plans is more varied. Here, the most important anti-discrimination
provisions are those covering self-insured medical reimbursement plans.
In general, these anti-discrimination rules require that rank-and-file
4. .LR.C. § 401(a)(5) (1988). The actual rules are considerably more complex than the rule of
straight proportionality might suggest. For example, the proportionality rule is weakened by the so-
called "integration" provisions, which, in the case of a so-called defined contribution retirement plan,
allow employer social security contributions to be treated as employer retirement plan contributions (and
in the case of a defined benefit retirement plan, allow social security benefits to be treated as retirement
plan benefits). I.R.C. § 401(l) (1988). On the other hand, the relaxation of the proportionality rule by
the integration provisions is in some cases more than offset by the strengthening of that rule under the
so-called "top heavy" provisions. These provisions limit benefits to the group of elite "key employees"
(e.g., super highly compensated employees) beyond that required by the proportionality rule in cases
in which the ratio of key employees to rank-and-file workers is quite high, and as a result a large
proportion of total benefits go to the former group of employees. I.R.C. § 416 (1988). See generally
Bankman, supra note 3, at 795-800.
5. I.R.C. § 414(q), 415(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. I.R.C. § 415(d)(1) (1988).
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employees receive the same benefits as highly compensated employees
If, for example, a plan reimburses highly compensated employees for the
cost of psychotherapy, it must provide a similar reimbursement for rank-
and-file employees. The term "highly compensated employee" is defined
for these purposes as one of the five highest paid officers, a shareholder
who owns more than ten percent of the value of the stock of the employer,
or an individual who is among the highest paid twenty-five percent of all
employees.
Other anti-discrimination provisions affect the taxation of dependent care
benefits,9 group term life insurance benefits,"0 and discounts on certain
employer-provided goods and services." In general, these provisions
require that benefits provided to highly compensated employees must also
be provided to rank-and-file employees. 2
The penalty for non-compliance with the anti-discrimination rules varies.
If a self-reimbursed medical plan is found to discriminate, highly
compensated employees will be taxed on the value of benefits not provided
to rank-and-file employees. 3 In all other cases, highly compensated
employees will be taxed on the full value of benefits received. 4
The anti-discrimination provisions are subject to constant administrative
and legislative change. For example, under former Internal Revenue Code
section 89, enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, virtually all tax-
favored employee welfare benefits were subject to the same sort of anti-
discrimination provisions that now apply to self-insured medical reimburse-
ment plans5" That provision, however, had a prospective effective date
and was repealed prior to the end of the taxable year in which it was to
7. I.ILC. § 105(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. § 105(h)(5).
9. I.R.C. § 129(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Id. § 79.
11. I.R.C. § 132(a), (j) (Supp. IV 1992).
12. Discrimination for purposes of § 79 is measured not with respect to highly compensated
employees but instead with respect to the more restricted category of "key employees." I.R.C. § 79
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The definition of key employee for purposes of § 79 is the same as for
purposes of the retirement plan provisions. See supra note 4. In order to qualify as non-discriminatory
under the dependent care provisions of§ 129, benefits must not only be made available to rank-and-file
employees, but a certain percentage of total benefits must in fact be used by such employees, See Id.
§ 129 (d)(8), (e)(5).
13. I.R.C. § 105(h)(1), (7) (Supp. IV 1992).
14. I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(1), 129(d)(1), 402(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(a)(2)
(1989).
15. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2494-502 (1986).
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become effective.16
II. EFFECT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS IN INDUSTRIES WITH A
CONSTANT RATIO OF RANK-AND-FILE TO HIGHLY
COMPENSATED WORKERS
It is useful to begin by analyzing the effect of the anti-discrimination
provisions in the special case of an industry that requires a fixed input ratio
of rank-and-file to highly compensated workers. Such an industry cannot
substitute rank-and-file employees for highly compensated employees, or
vice-versa, or differentially replace one set of employees through automa-
tion, as the relative wage rates of the two sets of employees change. 7
Consider, first, the determination of equilibrium wage rates in a world
with no tax-favored benefits and (quite obviously) no anti-discrimination
provisions. Assume that industry requires an equal number of highly
compensated and rank-and-file workers, and that demand for the number
of each set of workers is given by the function D = 220,000 - Pr.sf - Phce,
where Pr, f stands for the salary of rank-and-file workers and Phce stands for
the salary of highly compensated workers. (Most realistic examples of
fixed input ratios will produce nonlinear factor demand functions. Here as
elsewhere this paper adopts linear demand-and linear supply-functions
for heuristic purposes.) The supply of rank-and-file workers is given by the
function Sff = 5*P, i, the supply of highly compensated workers is given
by the function S,,ce = Ph,,. Under these conditions, supply will equal
demand at 100,000 rank-and-file and 100,000 highly compensated
workers.'" Highly compensated workers will receive a salary of $100,000;
rank-and-file workers will receive $20,000. Assume further that absent tax
benefits employers do not provide any of the fringe benefits now subject
16. Pub. L. No. 101-140, § 203(a), 103 Stat. 830-32 (1989).
17. All industries probably have some ability to change the ratio of rank-and-file to highly
compensated workers. Some industries, however, will not be able to significantly change that ratio
absent dramatic changes in the relative costs of the two forms of workers. In this connection, one might
think of a professional sports franchise, which employs highly paid athletes and low-paid concession-
aires or other workers. A more familiar example of an industry for which substitution is difficult may
be that of large law firms, which (notwithstanding automation) seem to require a relatively fixed ratio
of highly paid attorneys and less well-compensated support staff.
18. Since at equilibrium, S,,,,=S,, SMtl=5P,,rand S., = P., then, at equilibrium, 5Psfmust equal
P -, and P., must equal .2P,,. It is then possible to substitute .2P., for PPs in the demand function,
set the demand function equal to the supply of highly compensated employees, and solve for the salary
of highly compensated employees (P,,_). The number of highly compensated employees is then
determined by the supply function (S = Ph,). Similar analysis provides the salary and supply of rank-
and-file employees.
1994]
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to the anti-discrimination provisions.1 9 (Highly compensated employees,
in particular, may place some positive value on employer-provided benefits,
but it is assumed that this premium is not great enough to justify the cost
of employer plans.)
Assume now that the present tax-favored benefit provisions are passed
without the corresponding anti-discrimination rules. Employer benefit plans
are quite valuable to highly compensated employees. Such employees
would in any event spend money on the items that now can be provided on
a tax-favored basis. For example, highly compensated employees may be
expected to save for retirement and spend substantial sums on medical care.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the benefit plans may be treated as
a single benefit and that, due to the favorable tax treatment, the first dollar
of benefit provided by an employer is worth $1.725 to highly compensated
employees.2" The value of each additional dollar of benefit declines at a
rate of 2% for every thousand dollars of benefit, so that after an employee
has $1,000 of benefit, the marginal value of an additional $1 of benefit is
only about $1.69 (98% of $1.725), and after an employee has $2,000 of
benefit, the marginal value of an additional $1 of benefit is only about
$1.66. The value of an additional $1 of benefits does not fall below $1
until over $27,000 of benefits have been provided. t
Rank-and-file employees place a lower dollar value on retirement
19. In reality, employers may well provide some fringe benefits even absent the favorable tax
rules. For example, group rates for medical and life insurance are well below individual rates. This
is because individual purchase of insurance raises issues of adverse selection-demand is greater for
those who expect to die sooner or use more medical care. Adverse selection is limited when insurance
is purchased for a group by an employer without significant knowledge of the health of its employees.
However, the purpose of this analysis is to identify the effects of the anti-discrimination provisions in
those situations in which the favored benefits and provisions change behavior. It is therefore possible
to assume away a "baseline" purchase of benefits.
20. In reality, of course, each benefit would be separately valued by highly compensated
employees. The assumption adopted above will simplify exposition without altering any of the analytic
insights of this model.
21. The value of benefits may be defined mathematically as U(B) = 1725 * .98a/In(.98) + K,
where B stands for the level of benefits (in thousands of dollars), In stands for natural logarithm and
K is an arbitrary constant (here, 85384.6).
Quite obviously, any assumption as to valuation is arbitrary. The assumption that the utility of each
unit ofbenefits declines by a constant percentage is consistent with the assumption of"constant absolute
risk aversion" that is commonly used in economic modelling. The assumption that the first dollar of
benefit is worth $1.725 is consistent with the tax savings realized by an employee who receives a
welfare benefit such as employer-provided medical care and who faces the following effective marginal
tax rates: state income tax-I %; federal income tax-39.6%; and federal hospital insurance tax-Il.45%.
An employee in that situation whose medical expenses fall below 7.5% of adjusted gross income and
therefore cannot be deducted would require $172.50 in taxable salary to purchase $100 of medical care.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/3
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benefits. Such employees are for the most part in low or zero tax brackets
and do not much benefit from the tax savings. Moreover, under normal
circumstances, rank-and-file employees would save a much smaller
percentage of their income than highly compensated employees. Indeed,
given the low wage rate specified here, and depending on the cost of living,
a rank-and-file employee without other sources of income may require all
her cash compensation just to pay for bare necessities such as food, rent
and child care. Rank-and-file employees would also place a lower value
on medical benefits, in part because such employees do not benefit much
from the favorable tax treatment, and in part because, in general, such
employees would not spend as much on medical care as highly compensat-
ed employees. Rank-and-file employees are less likely than highly
compensated employees to spend money on items such as psychotherapy
or orthodonture, or to purchase high-cost medical insurance that allows for
the insured to select a physician unrelated to a health maintenance
organization. As income falls below a certain level, rank-and-file
employees are apt to go without any medical coverage whatsoever, as all
income is spent on more immediate necessities. Assume, therefore, that
rank-and-file employees value the first dollar of benefits at only $.70, and
that the value of each additional dollar of benefit declines at a rate of 10%
for every thousand dollars of benefit, so that after an employee has $1,000
of benefit, the marginal value of an additional $1 of benefit is only about
$.63, and after an employee has $2,000 of benefit, the marginal value of an
additional $1 of benefit is only about $.57.'
Employers may be expected to respond to the new tax rules by giving
highly compensated workers less cash salary and more tax-favored benefits.
Employers should continue to replace salary with benefits until the
marginal value of the benefit is less than the salary forgone. Here, that will
occur after the employer has paid out $27,000 of benefits. The $27,000 of
benefits, under the above formula, has a value to the employees of about
$36,000. In the short-term, the savings should accrue to employers, who
now are able to attract the present workforce by spending only $91,000
($27,000 in benefits and $64,000 in cash) rather than $100,000 on
compensation to highly compensated employees. The employers will not
provide benefits to rank-and-file employees, because such employees will
value even the first $1,000 of benefits at less than cost.
22. The value of benefits may be defined mathematically as U(B) = 700 * .9,17n(9) + K, where
B stands for the level of benefits (in thousands of dollars), In stands for natural logarithm and K is an
arbitrary constant (here, 6643.9).
1994]
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The increased profits realized from reduced payroll increase output and
demand for labor. The new equilibrium can be determined by rewriting the
supply curve of the highly compensated workers as S = P + $9,000,
because, given an optimal level of benefits, it will require $9,000 less
aggregate compensation to induce a given level of labor. The increased
demand for labor results in a new equilibrium of 104,100 highly compen-
sated employees earning compensation that is valued by such employees as
$104,100 and a like number of rank-and-file employees earning $20,800.
Not surprisingly, the increased demand for labor also increases employee
surplus; that is, that portion of the perceived compensation above the
reservation price. Rank-and-file employee surplus increases from $1 billion
to $1.083 billion, while highly compensated employee surplus rises from
$5 billion to $5.418 billion.
As is evident from the numbers, the tax-favored nature of fringe benefits
has improved the position of not only employers and highly compensated
employees, but also of rank-and-file employees who did not receive the
benefits. The reason for this is that the favorable tax rules reduced payroll
costs, thereby increasing demand for labor. Because the ratio of rank-and-
file and highly compensated employees is fixed, demand increased as much
for rank-and-file employees as for highly compensated employees. The
increased demand, in turn, increased wages.
Assume now that the favorable tax provisions are coupled with anti-
discrimination provisions and that these provisions require absolute equality
of benefits.' The industry can now provide $27,000 of benefits to the
highly compensated employees only if it also provides that amount of
benefit to the rank-and-file employees. Because rank-and-file employees
value benefits at less than cost, however, employers cannot costlessly
substitute benefits for cash salary and still maintain the same labor supply.
Employers can optimize under the new rules by providing benefits until the
marginal valuation of benefit by employees is no longer greater than the
marginal cost. Here, that occurs after only about $5,000 of benefits are
paid to each set of employees. Rank-and-file employees value such
benefits at $2,700; highly compensated employees value such benefits at
23. The assumption of absolute equality of benefits is made for heuristic purposes. In fact, with
respect to retirement benefits, which are the most significant benefits subject to the anti-discrimination
requirements, the law requires only proportionate equality. See supra at note 4. The assumption of
absolute rather than proportionate equality will overstate the costs of the anti-discrimination
requirements, but will not affect the basic analytic structure of the analysis herein.
[VOL. 72:597
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$8,200.24 In total, then, the employer provides $10,000 of benefits valued,
in the aggregate, at $10,900. In the short-term, employers can reduce
salary by this latter amount.
As in the analysis immediately above, the increased profits realized from
reduced payroll increase output and demand for labor. Under the
conditions described above, the industry reaches a new equilibrium supply
of 100,400 highly compensated employees earning compensation that is
valued by such employees as $100,400 and a like number of rank-and-file
employees earning $22,400 valued as $20,100.25 Rank-and-file workers
are better off than they were without the introduction of tax-favored
benefits, but not as well off as they were when the tax-favored benefits
were left undisturbed by the anti-discrimination provisions. Here, the
coupling of anti-discrimination requirements with the tax-favored benefit
provisions has reduced the perceived compensation of rank-and-file workers
by $700 (from $20,800 to $20,100). Employee surplus is similarly
reduced. Rank-and-file employee surplus falls from $1.083 billion to
$1.009 billion, while highly compensated employee surplus falls from
$5.418 billion to $5.040 billion. The precise decline in rank-and-file
compensation is, of course, a product of the supply, demand and valuation
functions above. However, under all plausible circumstances, in industries
that cannot alter the ratio of rank-and-file and highly compensated
employees, the anti-discrimination requirements will reduce the perceived
compensation of rank-and-file employees by reducing demand for labor.
III. SUBSTITUTION OF HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES FOR
RANK-AND-FILE WORKERS
The unambiguous results derived in the previous Part depend on the
assumption that the industry subject to anti-discrimination requirements
requires a fixed proportion of rank-and-file and highly compensated
workers. In real life, of course, industries can often substitute rank-and-file
employees for highly compensated employees and vice versa. The
substitutability of different sorts of workers greatly complicates any
analysis of the anti-discrimination provisions. To understand why this is
so, consider again the effect of those provisions on the wage rates of any
24. These values may be determined by substituting 5 for B in the valuation functions described
above.
25. The new equilibrium can be determined by rewriting the supply curve of highly compensated
workers as S = P + 3200 and the supply curve of rank-and-file workers as S = 5(P - 2300) and solving
as described in supra note 18.
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given industry. The favorable tax treatment of benefits absent the anti-
discrimination provisions increases profits in the short term. In a
competitive industry, this would be expected to increase production, and all
else equal, to increase employment of both highly compensated and rank-
and-file employees.
However, with respect to the decision to hire highly compensated or
rank-and-file workers, all else is not equal. Employers are able to provide
highly compensated employees with desired tax-favored benefits and in so
doing reduce the amount of total compensation paid to such employees.
Rank-and-file employees benefit less from the favorable tax provisions and
in general prefer cash to benefits. The favorable tax provisions can be
described as a wage subsidy that increases with increasing employment of
highly compensated workers. The subsidy changes the relative price of
highly compensated and rank-and-file employees and causes employers to
hire more of the former and less of the latter. Consider, for example, a
computer manufacturer's decision whether to hire a highly compensated
product quality engineer or to hire two additional assembly line workers to
inspect finished goods. At the margin, the favorable tax provisions, which
reduce the cost of the engineer's service, may well cause the manufacturer
to hire the engineer over the rank-and-file workers.
In situations in which the kind of substitution described above is
possible, the favorable tax provisions, absent the anti-discrimination
requirements, have an ambiguous effect on the welfare of rank-and-file
employees. The tax provisions lead to expansion of production, which
generally leads to greater demand for rank-and-file workers, and hence
greater pay for such workers. On the other hand, the provisions lead to
substitution of highly compensated workers for rank-and-file workers. The
reduced demand caused by this effect lowers the wages of the rank-and-file
workers. Which of the two effects will dominate is an empirical question
the answer to which will vary from industry to industry.
Consider, now, the effect on rank-and-file workers of the favorable tax
provisions with the anti-discrimination provisions. Once again, there will
be an income or output effect and a substitution effect. The output effect
will be uniformly negative: the provisions increase the wage costs in
general, and therefore reduce industry output, which in itself reduces
demand for all types of labor. As evidenced by the example in Part II, so
long as rank-and-file workers value benefits less than highly compensated
employees, the requirement that benefits be equalized across employees
means that the employer must give highly compensated employees fewer
benefits than would otherwise be optimal or give rank-and-file employees
[VOL. 72:597
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more benefits than would otherwise be optimal or both. This increases
payroll costs and, all else equal, reduces output. Thus, the demand for all
sorts of labor is reduced. The reduced demand causes the perceived
compensation of rank-and-file (and highly compensated) workers to fall.
The anti-discrimination requirements, when coupled with the tax-favored
nature of the benefit, will also produce a substitution effect, albeit of a
unique nature. Here, the substitution effect will vary from firm to firm not
only in intensity but in direction. The ambiguous nature of the substitution
effect is due to the fact that the relative price of workers is determined not
only by external markets but by the ratio of highly compensated to rank-
and-file employees within each individual firm. As made evident in the
examples provided below, for some firms, the anti-discrimination
requirements will increase the relative cost of highly compensated
employees; for other firms, the requirements will increase the relative cost
of rank-and-file employees. To put the matter somewhat differently,
depending on the ratio of highly compensated to rank-and-file employees,
and on the value placed upon the benefits by both sets of employees, a
particular firm may be able to minimize costs by substituting highly
compensated for rank-and-file employees, or vise versa.
Consider, first, the position of the computer manufacturer described
above under circumstances in which the cost of the anti-discrimination
provisions can be most easily avoided by further reducing the proportion
of rank-and-file workers. Assume that, even after substituting highly
compensated employees for rank-and-file employees, the computer
manufacturer retains a considerable number of rank-and-file employees. In
a world without anti-discrimination requirements, the manufacturer does not
receive a subsidy for the employment of such employees; that is, the
manufacturer cannot realize payroll savings by furnishing such employees
benefits that provide equal value at less cost. On the other hand, the
employment of rank-and-file employees does not threaten the payroll
savings realized from providing a benefit-rich mix of compensation to
highly compensated employees. If the favorable tax provisions are coupled
with the anti-discrimination requirements and the manufacturer (irrationally)
wishes to make no further changes in the ratio of highly compensated to
rank-and-file employees, it is faced with two alternatives. The manufactur-
er can retain the payroll savings attributable to highly compensated
employees by retaining the present level of benefits and providing an equal
level of benefits to rank-and-file employees. If, as is likely, rank-and-file
employees value the benefits at less than their cost, the manufacturer must
increase the total compensation to rank-and-file employees to keep the level
1994]
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of perceived compensation constant. Alternatively, given the (irrational)
desire to retain the present ratio of rank-and-file and highly compensated
employees, the manufacturer may find it optimal to reduce the level of
benefits to all employees and lose much of the savings it reaped in the
world without anti-discrimination requirements. In the example in Part II,
the employer could not vary the ratio of the two groups of employees and
found it optimal to reduce the level of benefits from $27,000 for highly
compensated employees to $5,000 for all employees. This response left the
employer with savings of $900 per paired employee-far less than the
$9,000 savings reaped in the world without anti-discrimination require-
ments.
We assume here that the manufacturer can in fact vary the ratio of rank-
and-file to highly compensated employees. As a result, the manufacturer
may be able to avoid both of the undesirable alternatives described above
by further reducing the proportion of rank-and-file employees. To take an
extreme example, suppose that the manufacturer is able to replace all of its
remaining rank-and-file employees through automation, and that in the
world without anti-discrimination requirements automation would increase
net costs by $500 a year per employee. Quite clearly, absent the anti-
discrimination requirements, the employer would not.automate. If the anti-
discrimination requirements are in effect, however, the manufacturer must
either pay a high level of benefits to rank-and-file employees, and increase
total compensation to rank-and-file employees to offset the difference
between the costs and perceived value of the benefits, or reduce the
benefits to highly compensated employees, and lose some or all of the
savings reaped from providing that group of employees with a high level
of benefits. If the cost of the better of these two alternatives is greater than
$500 per employee, the manufacturer will automate.
In the above example, the anti-discrimination requirements might
appropriately be viewed as a tax upon the continued employment of rank-
and-file workers-a tax that could be avoided through automation. In other
cases, this tax may be avoided by replacing rank-and-file employees with
highly compensated employees. Assume, for example, that the computer
manufacturer described above may replace two rank-and-file workers with
one highly compensated worker at a net cost, exclusive of the effect of the
anti-discrimination rules, of $500 per year. In the absence of anti-
discrimination rules, the employer will not make that substitution. In the
presence of the anti-discrimination provisions, the computer manufacturer
may well find it profitable to incur that cost.
In some cases, then, the anti-discrimination provisions will cause
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employers to reduce the proportion of rank-and-file workers in order to
retain as much as possible of the payroll savings realized from providing
highly compensated (and only highly compensated) employees with tax-
favored benefits. The reduced demand for rank-and-file employees will
reduce the perceived compensation of those employees left in the industry.
Somewhat surprisingly, under certain circumstances the anti-discrimina-
tion requirements may also be seen to impose a cost on the employment of
highly compensated employees. Consider, for example, a company, such
as a chain of discount department stores, with relatively few highly
compensated employees. In a world with no anti-discrimination require-
ments, the chain may find it advantageous to structure the pay of its highly
compensated workers to include a large benefit component. This, in turn,
may reduce the relative cost of hiring highly compensated workers and lead
to some substitution of highly compensated workers for rank-and-file
workers. Assume now that the favorable tax provisions are coupled with
anti-discrimination requirements, and that the benefits are undervalued
(relative to cost) by rank-and-file employees. The chain may find that
under its current ratio of rank-and-file to highly compensated employees,
it cannot profitably offer any benefits. The decline in perceived value
(relative to cost) to rank-and-file employees from tax-favored benefits
outweighs any increase in perceived value (relative to cost) to highly
compensated employees. The chain may further find that it is not able to
reduce its rank-and-file employees by hiring more highly compensated
employees or automating. The chain will therefore eliminate its benefit
plans. Highly compensated employees who were hired because of those
plans will now be too costly to retain. The substitution effect present in a
world with favorable benefit provisions and no anti-discrimination
requirements will now work in reverse. Here, the anti-discrimination
provisions have eliminated the net advantage to hiring highly compensated
employees and, as a result, the proportion of rank-and-file employees in the
industry will rise. All else equal, the increased demand for rank-and-file
employees will lead to increased compensation of those employees.
Finally, in some cases, the substitution effect will work in different
directions in the same firm or industry. A firm or industry may respond
to the anti-discrimination provisions by substituting some rank-and-file
employees with highly compensated employees (or by automating) and still
end up reducing the level of benefits, thereby letting go other highly
compensated employees.
In sum, the anti-discrimination requirements will produce an income or
output effect that uniformly reduces the perceived compensation of rank-
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and-file employees and a substitution effect that may either increase or
decrease the perceived compensation of rank-and-file employees.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The above analysis, while a good deal more detailed than in previous
articles, is still quite basic. It is useful, here, to briefly discuss three
simplifying assumptions on which the analysis rests. First, all rank-and-file
employees are considered to have the same welfare function with respect
to benefits. The same is true with respect to highly compensated
employees. In fact, rank-and-file employees will place different values
upon tax-favored benefits. This different valuation may create a segmented
market within each industry, with one group of firms offering a high level
of benefits and another offering a low level of benefits. Second, anti-
discrimination provisions that affect labor and output in one industry will
affect labor and output in other industries as well. For example, provisions
that cause an exodus of rank-and-file employees in one industry may cause
an increase in the supply of rank-and-file employees in another industry.
This, in turn, may affect the price of labor and output in the second
industry, which in turn may affect the cost of raw materials in the first
industry. The above analysis ignores these sorts of general equilibrium
considerations. Finally, the analysis ignores the effect that the favorable
tax provisions and anti-discrimination provisions have on tax revenues. In
the above analysis, the favorable tax provisions increase demand for labor.
Assume, however, that the tax revenue lost through those provisions is
offset by higher taxes elsewhere and that those higher taxes are borne in
some part by industries that take advantage of the favorable tax provisions.
If that is the case, the increase in output caused by the favorable tax
provisions may be offset entirely by a decrease in output caused by
replacement taxes.
The above analysis also ignores, by implication, the possibility that
actual employee welfare may diverge from perceived employee welfare.
Rank-and-file employees may systematically underestimate the importance
of retirement savings, medical coverage; or other benefits covered by the
anti-discrimination provisions. If that is the case, the anti-discrimination
provisions may be justified on paternalistic grounds.26 The above analysis
is also missing a discussion of "free rider" problems posed by employees
without retirement income, medical coverage, or other benefits. The costs
26. See generally Bankman, supra note 3, at 814-821.
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of employees without medical insurance, for example, may be borne in the
first instance by hospitals, and then passed on to providers or consumers
of health care, or to government agencies that fund medical care. The anti-
discrimination provisions may reduce such negative externalities of the
labor contract and be desirable even in those cases in which they reduce the
welfare of rank-and-file employees.
V. OTHER EFFECTS
The above analysis has focused on how the anti-discrimination
requirements affect the wages and perceived welfare of rank-and-file
employees. The anti-discrimination requirements may affect the economy
in other ways as well. For example, as suggested by the examples above,
the anti-discrimination requirements encourage a homogeneous mix of
employees. Indeed, the requirements have no effect on industries or firms
that employ only rank-and-file workers or only highly compensated
workers. A firm with a homogenous mix of employees may well pass up
an opportunity to formally expand if expansion would introduce heteroge-
neity into its workforce. Instead, such a firm might attempt to achieve a
form of de facto expansion through contract. Consider, for example, a
start-up with a highly skilled and highly compensated workforce and a new
product ready for manufacture. The anti-discrimination requirements will
discourage the start-up from establishing its own manufacturing facilities
and hiring low-paid assembly line workers. Instead, the start-up is more
apt to contract out its manufacturing to a company whose workforce is
predominantly rank-and-file and therefore not affected by the anti-
discrimination requirements. This behavioral distortion may create
significant inefficiencies when there are organizational advantages to
vertical integration.
The tendency of the anti-discrimination provisions to lead to a more
homogeneous workforce may also increase the sensitivity of rank-and-file
unemployment to technological change. A reduction in the rank-and-file
workforce due to technological advances will increase the likelihood that
a firm will be able to take advantage of the favored benefit provisions. As
illustrated in the above examples, once a firm has a sufficiently low
percentage of rank-and-file workers to make the adoption of tax-favored
benefits economically attractive, the relative cost of rank-and-file and
highly compensated employees changes dramatically. Highly compensated
employees become cheaper (because they value benefits above cost) and
rank-and-file employees become more expensive (because they must
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receive coverage and value the benefits at less than cost). The changes in
relative price may induce further substitution of highly compensated
employees for rank-and-file employees. In a small way then, the anti-
discrimination provisions may exacerbate the problem of structural
unemployment arising from so-called "technological shock."
VI. CONCLUSION
The effect of the anti-discrimination provisions on the perceived welfare
of rank-and-file employees depends on the substitutability of highly
compensated and rank-and-file employees, the value each group of
employees places upon a given level of benefits, and the supply and
demand curves for each type of employee. In industries that require a fixed
ratio of highly compensated to rank-and-file workers, the favorable tax
provisions absent the anti-discrimination requirements will lead to increased
demand for all types of labor, which in turn will unambiguously improve
the welfare of rank-and-file workers. The coupling of the favorable tax
provisions with the anti-discrimination requirements will reduce demand for
labor and reduce the perceived welfare of rank-and-file employees.
The favorable tax provisions, considered without regard to the anti-
discrimination requirements, will increase output and, hence, demand for
labor in industries which can substitute one group of employees for
another, or change the ratio of the two groups of employees through
automation. In such industries, however, the favorable tax provisions will
also lead to substitution of highly compensated employees for rank-and-file
employees. The net effect on the demand for rank-and-file employees (and
hence on the perceived compensation or surplus of such employees)
depends on whether, as an empirical matter, the income or output effect
dominates the substitution effect.
The anti-discrimination provisions will also cause an income or output
and substitution effect in industries that can vary the ratio of highly
compensated to rank-and-file employees. The output effect will reduce the
demand for labor and thereby reduce the perceived compensation of rank-
and-file employees. The substitution effect is ambiguous. Some industries
or employers will respond to the anti-discrimination requirements by further
reducing the proportion of rank-and-file workers. This additional reduction
in demand for rank-and-file workers will further reduce the perceived
compensation of such workers. Other industries or employers will respond
to the anti-discrimination requirements by reducing or eliminating the level
of tax-favored benefits offered. This, in turn, will reduce or eliminate the
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substitution effect that takes place in the world without anti-discrimination
provisions. Employers will hire fewer highly compensated workers, and
more rank-and-file workers, than would be the case if the anti-discrimina-
tion requirements did not exist. Under these circumstances, the anti-
discrimination requirements will produce a substitution effect that increases
demand for, and perceived compensation of, rank-and-file workers.
In sum, there is one set of circumstances under which the anti-discrimi-
nation requirements will unambiguously improve the welfare of rank-and-
file employees: the industry must be able to vary the proportion of highly
compensated and rank-and-file workers; the anti-discrimination require-
ments must reduce (rather than increase) the substitution of highly
compensated workers for rank-and-file workers that would otherwise take
place; and rank-and-file workers must benefit more from the reduced
substitution than they would from the increased demand for labor present
in a world without the anti-discrimination provisions. Under all other
assumptions described herein the anti-discrimination provisions will reduce
the perceived compensation of rank-and-file workers.
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